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SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AND
BANKRUPT COMPANIES
James J. Park*
Securities class actions are often criticized as wasteful strike suits that tar-
get temporary fluctuations in the stock prices of otherwise healthy
companies. The securities class actions brought by investors of Enron and
WorldCom, companies that fell into bankruptcy in the wake of fraud, re-
sulted in the recovery of billions of dollars in permanent shareholder
losses and provide a powerful counterexample to this critique. An issuer's
bankruptcy may affect how judges and parties perceive securities class ac-
tions and their merits, yet little is known about the subset of cases where
the company is bankrupt.
This is the first extensive empirical study of securities class actions and
bankrupt companies. It examines 1,466 securities class actions filed from
1996 to 2004, of which 234 (16 percent) involved companies that were in
bankruptcy proceedings while the class action was pending. The study tests
two hypotheses. First, securities class actions involving bankrupt compa-
nies ("bankruptcy cases") are more likely to have actual merit than
securities class actions involving companies not in bankruptcy ("nonbank-
ruptcy cases"). Second, bankruptcy cases are more likely to be perceived
as having merit than nonbankruptcy cases, regardless of their actual merit.
The study finds stronger support for the second hypothesis than for the
first, suggesting that judges and parties use bankruptcy as a heuristic for
merit. Even when controlling for various indicia of merit, bankruptcy cas-
es are more likely to be successful in terms of dismissal rates, significant
settlements, and third-party settlements than nonbankruptcy cases. These
results are evidence that judges use heuristics not only to dismiss cases but
also to avoid dismissing cases.
Securities class actions cannot be adequately understood without examin-
ing the subset of cases with a bankrupt issuer. The perception that
securities class actions merely harass healthy companies should be revised
in light of the significant number of bankruptcy cases in which sharehold-
ers have a greater need for a securities fraud remedy.
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Stephen Choi, Sean
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INTRODUCTION
When securities class actions target temporary stock price declines, they
often create unwarranted costs for otherwise healthy companies. Stock price
fluctuations often reflect market overreaction to short-term developments.
Shareholder value will recover once the market reassesses the situation.'
Investors are aware that stock prices change frequently and can protect
1. See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and Job-5 Dam-
ages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 35 (1994) ("[S]tock price
crashes are short-term phenomena .... [Bluilt-in forces, namely the informed investors' reali-
zation that the stock price is below fundamentals, will start operating in a crash and return the
price to its fundamental or equilibrium value.").
Securities Class Actions
themselves in part through diversification.' However, securities class action
attorneys, who receive a substantial percentage of any recovery, have signif-
icant monetary incentives to link such fluctuations to a theory of securities
fraud. The defendant company must spend significant resources in litigating
the truth of the asserted fraud claim, reducing shareholder wealth.'
Securities class actions directed at frauds involving large public compa-
nies that suddenly filed for bankruptcy, such as Enron and WorldCom,
present a powerful counterexample to this pessimistic account. The stock
prices of these companies did not just fluctuate and recover-they precipi-
tously and completely collapsed in light of revelations that their financial
statements were overstated by billions of dollars. Though shareholder
wealth is typically wiped out in bankruptcy, Enron and WorldCom investors
recovered billions of dollars through securities class actions.4 In the wake of
Enron and WorldCom, it has become more difficult to argue that securities
class actions never serve a useful purpose for shareholders.
Though the Enron and WorldCom cases were the focus of much atten-
tion, very little is known about the subset of securities class actions
involving bankrupt companies. While many studies have examined the ques-
tion of whether securities class actions tend to have merit,' none have
extensively examined the frequency and characteristics of securities class
actions involving a bankrupt issuer. This subset of cases should be interest-
ing to scholars of securities litigation because it includes those cases in
which shareholders have suffered the greatest harm. The resolution of secu-
rities class actions in which a bankrupt company is the issuer may shed light
on the way in which context affects how parties and courts assess the merits
of lawsuits.
There are two competing views as to the relationship between bankrupt-
cy and securities fraud. One view is that companies approaching bankruptcy
have greater incentives to commit fraud in order to save the company or the
jobs of managers. There thus might be a causal relationship between bank-
ruptcy and securities fraud. The second view is that the context of
bankruptcy leads parties and judges to more readily assume that fraud was
present in bankrupt companies. This perception might reflect hindsight bias,
the tendency to overestimate the predictability of events, leading to the
2. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securi-
ties Cases, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 611, 641 (1985) (observing that diversified investors are
protected from impact of securities fraud).
3. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 572 (1991) (arguing that shareholder compen-
sation shifts losses "from current ... to former shareholders" and that "the net result is simply
the destruction of shareholder value in the amount of the transaction costs of the litigation").
4. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2008
WL 4178151 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2008) (approving $7 billion settlement fund including settle-
ments by gatekeepers); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2005 WL
2319118 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2005) (approving $6 billion in settlements including settlements
by gatekeepers).
5. See infra note 44.
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conclusion that management knew of the danger of bankruptcy but failed to
disclose it. Class action attorneys may try to exploit this perception by
bringing a strike suit against the management of the bankrupt company as
well as third parties such as the company's auditor.
This study assesses the relationship between bankruptcy and securities
fraud by analyzing a data set of 1,466 consolidated class actions filed from
1996 to 2004, of which 234 (approximately 16 percent) cases involved a
company that was in bankruptcy during the pendency of the class action
("bankruptcy cases"). The study tests two hypotheses: (1) bankruptcy cases
are more likely to have actual merit than cases in which the issuer is not
bankrupt ("nonbankruptcy cases") and (2) bankruptcy cases are more likely
to be perceived as having merit than nonbankruptcy cases, regardless of the
actual relative merits. In testing these hypotheses, this study hopes to shed
light upon the nature and purpose of securities class actions. 6
The results of the study indicate stronger support for the second hypoth-
esis. With regard to the first hypothesis, the evidence is mixed as to whether
bankruptcy cases are more likely to involve valid allegations of fraud than
nonbankruptcy cases. While bankruptcy cases are somewhat more likely to
involve accounting restatements than nonbankruptcy cases, they are not
more likely to have other indicia of merit such as insider trading allegations,
parallel Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") actions, or a pension
fund lead plaintiff. On the other hand, bankruptcy cases are more likely to
succeed than nonbankruptcy cases. Bankruptcy cases are less likely to be
dismissed and are more likely to result in third-party settlements and in set-
tlements of $3 million or more than nonbankruptcy cases.
Regression analysis shows that this bankruptcy effect persists even when
controlling for factors relating to the merit of the case. Logistic regressions
were estimated with various measures of success as the dependent variable
and indicia of merit, case controls, and a bankruptcy variable as independent
variables. For all three regressions, the bankruptcy variable was statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
This bankruptcy effect is evidence that bankruptcy cases are treated dif-
ferently by parties and courts. The most likely explanation is that
bankruptcy is a heuristic judges use to avoid dismissing cases, perhaps
counteracting the tendency of judges to use heuristics to dismiss securities
class actions. Though the use of the bankruptcy heuristic is troubling to the
extent that it reflects hindsight bias, it is not so problematic if bankruptcy
cases serve a more useful purpose than nonbankruptcy cases. Indeed, in
bankruptcy cases, shareholder losses are permanent rather than temporary,
and compensation to shareholders for fraud does not reflect a meaningless
6. There is another interesting relationship between securities class actions and bank-
ruptcy. An empirical study by Lynn Bai, James Cox, and Randall Thomas finds evidence that
companies settling securities class actions are more likely to have liquidity problems and a
greater propensity to file for bankruptcy. See Lynn Bai et al., Lying and Getting Caught: An
Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U.
PA. L. REv. 1877 (2010). In contrast, this study focuses on the impact of bankruptcy filings
prior to the resolution of securities class actions as opposed to after their resolution.
[Vol. 111:547
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circular payment from shareholders to themselves. Judges may be influ-
enced not only by hindsight bias but also by policy considerations in
favoring bankruptcy cases.
In addition to its main finding-that there is a bankruptcy effect impact-
ing the adjudication of bankruptcy cases-this study makes a number of
findings relevant to understanding the nature of securities class actions. The
bankruptcy effect fades with respect to the largest settlements, those above
$20 million, likely reflecting the influence of directors and officers ("D&O")
insurance policy limits. Moreover, bankruptcy cases do not seem to do much
to determine the responsibility of individual defendants for the fraud, even
when vicarious liability for the bankrupt issuer is not a possibility.
This Article shows that securities class actions involving bankrupt com-
panies are an important subset of securities class actions. Far from just
harassing healthy companies, securities class actions often involve compa-
nies troubled enough to have fallen into bankruptcy. There is evidence that
judges and parties view these bankruptcy cases as more likely to have merit
than nonbankruptcy cases. This tendency perhaps reflects an intuition that
when fraud masks the impending bankruptcy of a company, there is a
stronger case for providing shareholders with a remedy through a securities
class action.
This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I describes the mechanics of
securities class actions in the bankruptcy context. Part II describes the data
set and provides some descriptive statistics. Part III tests two hypotheses: (1)
bankruptcy cases are more likely to have merit than nonbankruptcy cases,
and (2) bankruptcy cases are perceived as having more merit than nonbank-
ruptcy cases. It finds more support for the second hypothesis than for the
first. Part IV analyzes the significance of these findings with respect to how
securities class actions are resolved as well as the general nature of securi-
ties class actions.
I. BACKGROUND
Securities class actions involving a bankrupt issuer are of interest be-
cause there is an intuitive relationship between bankruptcy and securities
fraud. There are two possible accounts of this relationship. First, there could
be an actual correlation between bankruptcy and securities fraud. Managers
might have greater incentive to commit fraud when a firm is heading toward
bankruptcy. Second, there could be no such correlation but rather a tendency
to jump to unwarranted conclusions of guilt when a bankrupt company is
accused of fraud, even when the company is actually innocent. This Part
discusses these alternative accounts of the relationship between bankruptcy
and securities fraud and summarizes past empirical studies on this topic. An
important consideration in studying bankruptcy cases is that the bankruptcy
process often precludes the issuer from directly contributing to any settle-
ment, leaving as contributors only individual defendants covered by an




A. Bankruptcy and Securities Fraud
This Section discusses the possible relationship between bankruptcy and
securities fraud. Companies heading toward bankruptcy might be more like-
ly to have managers who commit fraud. Alternatively, companies that end
up bankrupt may not be more likely to commit fraud, but hindsight bias may
lead to the perception that bankruptcy is associated with fraud.
1. Actual Fraud
Bankruptcy is a context in which we may see a greater incidence of
fraud than with respect to solvent companies. Managers have greater incen-
tives to commit fraud in the period leading up to bankruptcy. Managers of
companies that fall into bankruptcy might also be more likely to commit
fraud because of incompetence.
There are many reasons why a company could find itself filing for bank-
ruptcy.7 Some developments leading to bankruptcy are the result of
unavoidable macroeconomic trends, but others are at least partly the result
of managers making bad strategic decisions and failing to make necessary
investments. 8 A new company could find that expected demand for its prod-
uct never materializes. 9 The market for an established company's products
and services could shift unexpectedly, leaving the company without enough
revenue to cover its expenses." A company could overexpand, making it
difficult to cover larger expenses such as financing costs."I
The managers of a company have incentives to mask developments that
foreshadow bankruptcy. 2 Management could genuinely believe that the
company's poor performance is an aberration that is not indicative of future
performance. The managers might fear that if disappointing results are re-
leased, the market will overreact. Instead of reporting bad results, managers
can stretch ambiguous accounting standards to report results they believe are
more indicative of future performance, hoping to buy some time to save the
company.
On the other hand, managers can be motivated by selfish personal inter-
est rather than a genuine belief that what they are doing is best for the
company. Misrepresenting the company's performance will give managers
7. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
580-81 (1998); Hubert Ooghe & Sofie De Prijcker, Failure Processes and Causes of Company
Bankruptcy: A Typology, 46 MGMT. DECISION 223, 227-34 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Ooghe & De Prijcker, supra note 7, at 234-35 (discussing poor manage-
ment as a cause of bankruptcy).
9. See, e.g., id. at 228.
10. See, e.g., id. at 233.
11. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 7, at 580-81; Ooghe & De Prijcker, supra note 7, at
228-30.
12. See, e.g., Thomas Lys & Ross L. Watts, Lawsuits Against Auditors, 32 J. ACCT. RES.
(SUPPLEMENT) 65, 68 (1994) ("We argue that managers' incentives to mislead increase when
the firm is in financial distress.").
[Vol. 111:547
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time to exercise options or sell stock before the company's collapse. Fraud
might allow managers to keep their jobs while hoping that a miracle will
turn the company around.13 Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney have
identified these "last period agency costs" as a primary driver of securities
fraud. 14
There might also be a correlation between bankruptcy and securities
fraud because managers presiding over bankrupt companies are more likely
to be incompetent and thus more likely to misrepresent material facts about
the company. Bankruptcy may not cause fraud, but the same factors that
cause companies to go bankrupt can make it more likely that there is fraud
in such companies. Competent managers are more likely to avoid bankrupt-
cy and are also more likely to avoid committing fraud. If that is the case,
there would be a greater likelihood of fraud in bankrupt companies.
2. Perception of Fraud
Even if fraud is not more likely in bankrupt companies, there might be a
perception that bankruptcy is associated with fraud. One reason for this per-
ception is the risk of hindsight bias, the tendency to "overstate the
predictability of outcomes."'5 Because bankruptcy is a significant and ca-
lamitous event for a public corporation, factfinders might assume that
insiders with superior knowledge relative to investors must have known that
bankruptcy was imminent. If that is the case, the failure to disclose the de-
velopments that ultimately caused the bankruptcy is more likely to be
perceived as fraudulent. 16
To survive a motion to dismiss, any securities class action complaint al-
leging a violation of Rule 10b-5 must "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with" scienter.17 This
13. E.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Secu-
rities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 701 (noting that a manager
may benefit from fraud through "possible preservation of employment as well as the value of
the manager's assets related to the firm's stock, if by committing fraud he is able to buy suffi-
cient time to turn the ailing firm around").
14. See id. at 715 ("Under our last period hypothesis, Fraud on the Market usually re-
sults from the efforts of a few desperate managers to hide the fact that the corporation is ailing
or has done sufficiently badly relative to reasonable expectations that senior managers can
expect to be replaced.").
15. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 773, 778 (2004); see also
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L.
REv. 571, 571 (1998) ("[P]sychologists have demonstrated repeatedly that people overstate the
predictability of past events-a phenomenon that psychologists have termed the 'hindsight
bias.' ").
16. See, e.g., Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Litigation and Independent Auditors: The Role of
Business Failures and Management Fraud, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Spring 1987, at
90, 96 ("In the context of business failures, allegations usually include the assertion that busi-
ness difficulties were hidden by the use or manipulation of financial information, so that either
the existence or degree of financial distress was unexpected when finally disclosed.").
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
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burden to describe fraudulent intent can be met by alleging that the defend-
ant acted recklessly with respect to a disclosure. 8 Recklessness has been
defined by one circuit as "an extreme departure from the standards of ordi-
nary care to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it."' 9 Given the high
subjective standard for liability in Rule lOb-5 cases, hindsight bias might
not be a factor in all cases."0 But in a close case, hindsight bias can lead de-
cisionmakers to conclude that, in light of a company's bankruptcy,
management must have been aware of a risk that was not disclosed to inves-
tors.
The possibility of hindsight bias with respect to bankrupt companies has
long been acknowledged in the accounting literature. A number of studies
assessing various cases against auditors find hindsight bias in the way that
judges and juries assess auditor liability.2' In particular, the fact that an au-
dited company filed for bankruptcy may influence perception of the
auditor's conduct.2 2 However, there is some evidence that hindsight bias
18. E.g., Rothman v. Gregor, 220 E3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that "to plead sci-
enter ... a complaint may ... allege facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness"); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 E3d 970,
974 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that plaintiff "must plead, in great detail, facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct"). Of course,
in some circuits, plaintiffs can also plead scienter by alleging motive and opportunity, Roth-
man, 220 F.3d at 90, an arguably easier standard to meet.
19. Rothman, 220 F.3d at 90 (quoting Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d
38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)).
The standard for finding an auditor liable in a Rule lOb-5 case is an even higher standard
of recklessness. See, e.g., PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 E3d 671, 693 (6th Cir. 2004)
("[T]he meaning of recklessness in securities fraud cases is especially stringent when the
claim is brought against an outside auditor."); DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software,
Inc., 288 F3d 385, 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring allegation of "such an extreme departure
from reasonable accounting practice that [the auditor] knew or had to have known that its
conclusions would mislead investors" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rothman, 220 E3d
at 98 (noting that to find that an auditor acted recklessly, the conduct must "approximate an
actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited company" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In 1994, the Supreme Court rejected a more lenient standard of aiding and abetting for
holding auditors liable under Rule lOb-5. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
20. See, e.g., Rachlinksi, supra note 15, at 592 ("Even if subjective standards invite
biased judgments, the hindsight bias probably has less influence on judgments made under
subjective standards than it does on judgments made under objective standards.").
21. See, e.g., John C. Anderson et al., The Mitigation of Hindsight Bias in Judges'
Evaluation of Auditor Decisions, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Fall 1997, at 20, 21 ("[Wle
established the existence of hindsight bias with judges and then attempted to mitigate it with
two individual debiasing methods."). The hindsight bias may also affect auditors who evaluate
the work of other auditors. See Jane Kennedy, Debiasing the Curse of Knowledge in Audit
Judgment, 70 ACCT. REV. 249, 257 (1995) ("This experiment finds that subjects-auditors and
MBA students-are susceptible to outcome knowledge that should be ignored... ").
22. See, e.g., Thomas A. Buchman, An Effect of Hindsight on Predicting Bankruptcy
with Accounting Information, 10 ACcT., ORGS. & Soc'Y 267, 274 (1985) ("Reporting bank-
ruptcy increased the perceived likelihood that it would happen, as would be expected from
[Vol. 1 11:547
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does not uniformly influence decisions and liability may instead depend on
an assessment of the foreseeability of bankruptcy.23
The risk of hindsight bias may also influence the decision of defendants
to settle cases for significant amounts. Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith have
found through interviews of participants in securities class action settlement
negotiations that D&O insurers focus on what they call "sex appeal" in de-
termining settlement amounts.24 Bankruptcy is an obvious fact that will add
"sex appeal" to a case, resulting in a greater likelihood that settlements in
bankruptcy cases will be significant. Defendants themselves are subject to
hindsight bias, or are at least wary of the effects of hindsight bias, in deter-
mining the value of a claim.
B. Mechanics of Securities Class Actions
Involving Bankrupt Companies
Regardless of the precise cause, the impact of misrepresentations relat-
ing to the performance of a company heading toward bankruptcy can be
serious. If the market is fooled by the fraud, the stock price will not ade-
quately reflect the risk that the company will go bankrupt. Investors who
purchase stock at the fraudulent price will overpay by the amount the stock
would have been discounted if the truth were known. Management is less
likely to make necessary adjustments to their strategy without the pressure
of a declining stock price. The disciplining effect of a takeover is also less
likely when the stock price is inflated, possibly depriving the company of a
more competent management team that could turn the situation around.
Revelation of significant misrepresentations can result in substantial stock
price declines that destabilize the company as investors lose faith in the
credibility of management. As a result, a bankruptcy that might have been
avoidable can become unavoidable.
Securities class actions provide a remedy for the harm caused by mis-
representations made by a company in the period leading up to its
bankruptcy. Investors can bring suit against the company, its directors and
officers, as well as third-party gatekeepers such as auditors and underwriters
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,25  SEC Rule
prior research."); D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on
Jurors' Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION Sci. 401, 417 (1994) ("In spite of re-
ceiving instructions to base their responses on information available before learning of an
outcome, jurors tended to make auditor evaluative judgments in the direction of the negative
(bankruptcy) outcome. Outcome knowledge of the audit client's bankruptcy resulted in lower
evaluations of the auditor's performance.").
23. See Marianne M. Jennings et al., Causality as an Influence on Hindsight Bias: An
Empirical Examination of Judges' Evaluation of Professional Audit Judgment, 21 J. AccT. &
PUB. POL'Y 143, 161 (1998) ("[J]udges' assessments of the external auditor's responsibility to
anticipate the outcome was directly related to the degree of outcome foreseeability.").
24. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers'
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 787 (2009).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) (prohibiting manipulative and deceptive devices). The
Supreme Court has recognized an implied private right of action for investors harmed by
February 20131
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1Ob-5, 26 and section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (if the company issued
securities pursuant to a registration statement during the relevant
timeframe). 27
One complication with bringing a securities class action against a bank-
rupt issuer is that such litigation is generally subject to the Bankruptcy
Code's automatic stay, which typically halts litigation against a company
upon its filing for bankruptcy.28 Any judgment or settlement in a securities
class action against a company would be an unsecured claim,2 9 and any re-
covery by shareholders from the bankruptcy estate would be subordinate to
recovery by the company's more senior creditors.30 Though at times there
are deviations from this absolute priority rule,3' studies find that even when
shareholders receive a recovery, it is small.32 Reorganization plans often
discharge and release the bankrupt company from any obligations arising
from securities class actions.33 Therefore, it is rare, though not unheard of,
violations of section 10(b). See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318
(2007).
26. See 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (SEC Rule enacted pursuant to section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (providing cause of action against issuer and other parties
for misstatements in the registration statement).
28. See II U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
29. E.g., Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action, Motion for Attorneys' Fees,
and Settlement Fairness Hearing at 1, In re Eagle Bldg. Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02-80294-
CIV-RYSKAMP (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2006) ("Bankruptcy counsel for Eagle and counsel for the
Settlement Class have agreed that the Settlement Class shall have an unsecured claim of
$8,000,000 in Eagle's liquidation. However, secured and unsecured claims exceed the availa-
ble proceeds for liquidation and the Settlement Class is likely to receive only a small fraction
of its claim against Eagle from the bankruptcy estate.").
30. Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the following:
[A] claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an
affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or
for reimbursement or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim,
shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or in-
terest represented by such security, except that if such security is common stock, such
claim has the same priority as common stock.
II U.S.C. § 510(b).
For a critique of this provision, see generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of De-
frauded Securityholders in Corporate Bankruptcy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1 (1983).
31. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict
in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIs 511, 522 (2009) (finding that equityholders recover in
only 9 percent of chapter 11 cases when creditors have not been paid in full, marking a shift
from recovery rates during the 1980s).
32. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
125, 143 (1990) (finding equity recoveries of between $400,000 and $63 million).
33. See, e.g., Notice of Class Action, Proposed Settlement and Hearing Thereon at 1, In
re Mpower Commc'ns Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 00-CV-6463t(b) (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003) ("On
April 8, 2002, defendant Mpower Communications Corp. ('Mpower' or the 'Company') filed
a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. As of the effective date of
Mpower's First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (the 'Plan'), Mpower was discharged
[Vol. 111:547
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for a bankrupt company to contribute to the settlement of a securities class
action. As discussed below, most bankrupt issuers are not named as defend-
ants or are later dismissed from the securities class action once the trial
court becomes informed of the bankruptcy filing.
However, most public companies have insurance for their directors and
officers intended to cover the costs of securities litigation. Individual direc-
tors and officers are almost always covered by D&O insurance, and many
issuers purchase D&O insurance to cover the issuer's direct liability and
indemnification payments.3 4 Courts have generally found that D&O insur-
ance payments made directly on behalf of directors and officers are not part
of the bankruptcy estate and are therefore not subject to the automatic stay.3"
Indeed, such "Side A" policies appear to be specifically meant to cover situ-
ations in which the issuer is bankrupt.36 On the other hand, D&O policies
covering the company's indemnification obligations to directors and officers
have been found to be part of the bankruptcy estate.3 7 Similarly, while the
courts have not definitively ruled on whether D&O insurance covering the
company's direct liability is part of the bankruptcy estate, commentators
have argued that payments made on behalf of the issuer are likely consid-
ered part of the bankruptcy estate.3
8
and released from any claim, debt and interest, except as otherwise stated in the Plan, as set
forth in the final confirmation order entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware on July 17, 2002.").
34. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 1147, 1163-68 (2006).
35. See, e.g., Gillman v. Cont'l Airlines (In re Cont'l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 216-17
(3d Cir. 2000) (implying that D&O insurance proceeds are not property of bankruptcy estate
when nondebtor directors and officers are beneficiaries); La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed.
Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391, 1400-01 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
that D&O policy proceeds belonged to the directors and officers and were not part of the es-
tate). But see Amended Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action at 4, In
re Team Commc'ns Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-02312-DDP (SHx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004)
("The Trustee opposed the previous settlement reached by the parties on the grounds that the
settlement released claims belonging to Team against the Individual Defendants and others,
and that the insurance proceeds designated to fund that settlement were the property of Team's
bankruptcy estate, and could not be used to fund the settlement. On September 18, 2002, the
Bankruptcy Court denied a motion by one of the Insurers for relief from the Automatic Stay
under 11 U.S.C § 362, inter alia, on the grounds that the policy proceeds were the property of
Team's bankruptcy estate.").
36. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:
The Directors' & Officers'Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1803 (2007) ("Side A cover-
age typically comes into play only when the corporation is bankrupt or insolvent .... ").
37. See, e.g., Minoco Grp. of Cos., Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency of New Eng.
Reinsurance Corp. (In re Minoco Grp. of Cos., Ltd.), 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding that particular D&O insurance proceeds are "property of the estate ... because the
policies insure [the corporation] against indemnity claims"); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re
Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257, 259 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990).
38. See, e.g., Richard M. Cieri & Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Officers of
Corporations that Are Insolvent or in the Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important Considera-
tions, Practical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 295, 333-34 (2004); Nan Roberts
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Thus, securities class actions can often proceed despite the automatic
stay, but only Side A policies directly covering directors and officers can
fund any litigation or settlement costs. In virtually all cases, even when a
company has filed for bankruptcy, the securities class action will proceed
against some of the directors and officers of the corporation, and in some
cases, against third parties such as underwriters and auditors who are not
covered by the automatic stay. However, because the action is dismissed or
stayed with respect to the bankrupt company, it is less likely that the compa-
ny will directly contribute to the settlement. We thus might expect that
bankruptcy cases tend to involve smaller settlements than comparable non-
bankruptcy cases.
C. Prior Studies
Perhaps the first empirical study examining the relationship between se-
curities fraud and bankruptcy was a 1992 study by Arlen and Carney in
which they set forth and attempted to verify their "last period agency costs"
hypothesis. As noted earlier, that hypothesis predicts that securities fraud
tends to involve managers attempting to save their jobs when their firms are
heading toward bankruptcy.39 The Arlen and Carney study examined a sam-
ple of 111 reported decisions in securities class actions n° In that sample,
24.3 percent of the cases involved bankrupt companies n.4 The study found
support for the last period agency costs hypothesis in that most of the cases
involved allegations of fraud that masked stock price declines.42 However, as
acknowledged by the authors, a major limitation of the study was that it did
not have significant information on settlements, making it difficult to assess
whether bankruptcy cases were more likely to involve valid allegations of
fraud than nonbankruptcy cases. 4 3
More recent studies have looked at larger samples with more compre-
hensive settlement data but have not found any link between bankruptcy and
valid allegations of securities fraud. Two studies examined in passing the
effect of bankruptcy on the size of a securities class action settlement. 44 In a
Eitel, Now You Have It, Now You Don't: Directors' and Officers' Insurance After a Corporate
Bankruptcy, 46 Loy. L. REV. 585 (2000); see also Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fidu-
ciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83, 119-125 (2007) (noting that derivative
suits are controlled by the bankruptcy estate).
39. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 13, at 715.
40. See id. at 723.
41. Id. at 726.
42. Id. at 725.
43. See id. at 731 ("[A] sample of six firms is too small a sample from which to gener-
alize.").
44. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 3; James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-
Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903
(1996); Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 598 (2007); Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2009); Mari-
lyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litiga-
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study of the impact of pension fund lead plaintiffs on settlement size based
on a sample of 731 securities class action settlements, Michael A. Perino
found that bankruptcy was associated with smaller settlements.4 5 In another
study of lead plaintiffs, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, and Lynn Bai
examined a sample of 773 settled securities class actions and found that the
bankruptcy of a company did not have a statistically significant effect on the
size of the settlement. 46 These findings might be evidence that securities
class actions against bankrupt companies are not likely to have more merit
than securities class actions against nonbankrupt companies.
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, the fact that a company is in
bankruptcy is likely to impact the potential size of the settlement. In cases
where the company is not bankrupt, it could contribute to a securities class
action settlement so that the total settlement could exceed the limit of the
D&O insurance policy. When a company is bankrupt, the automatic stay
would likely prevent settlement payments that supplement those made by
D&O insurance policies. Of course, third-party defendants such as auditors
and underwriters could contribute to the settlement, but such third-party
settlements can be difficult to obtain.
Class action attorneys are aware of D&O insurance limits and may take
a smaller settlement in bankruptcy cases to avoid the risk that the D&O
policy may be exhausted by litigation. The Notice of Settlement for one se-
curities class action observed the following:
In this Action, there was the additional risk that even if Plaintiffs ultimately
prevailed, any recovery could well be substantially less than that obtained in
the proposed Settlement because of CHS' filing in bankruptcy. Under the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the filing means that the Action cannot
proceed against the Company. Thus, any recovery obtained would be against
the Individual Defendants alone and the insurance coverage available to
satisfy a judgment would be greatly depleted, if not exhausted, by the costs
of prosecuting the Action through trial and the subsequent appeals which
would surely follow if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial.47
Litigation Reform Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007); A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale,
What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125 (2005); see also Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55
(1991) (studying merit of derivative suits).
45. See Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analy-
sis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 368, 382 (2012).
46. James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and... There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical
Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REv. 355, 377 (2008) ("We also
find that class period length and bankruptcy filing are not significant explanatory variables for
settlement size."). Cox et al. observe that the absence of significance for the bankruptcy varia-
ble in their regressions may result from the fact that D&O policies are the primary source of
funding settlements in bankruptcy cases. Id. at 377 n.73.
47. Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement Thereof, Settlement Fair-
ness Hearing and Right to Share in Settlement Fund at 2, In re CHS Elecs., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 99-8186-CIV-GOLD/SIMONTON (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2001).
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Therefore, settlement size may not be a good indicator of the merits of the
underlying suit in bankruptcy cases. Understanding the relationship between
securities class actions and bankruptcy requires analyzing other indicators of
merit.
II. DATA SET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This Part describes the data set used in this study. The data set consists
of 1,466 consolidated securities class actions filed from 1996 to 2004.4 The
cases were drawn primarily from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clear-
inghouse and supplemented with information from the Public Access to
Court Electronic Records ("PACER") database, the LoPucki Bankruptcy
Research Database, Westlaw, LexisNexis, and other internet sources. The
data set consists of traditional Rule 10b-5 and section 11 securities class
actions alleging that issuers inflated their stock price by reporting mislead-
ing information about themselves in their periodic disclosures or registration
statements. It therefore does not include securities class actions relating to
research analyst fraud, investment adviser fraud, initial public offering
("IPO") tying, mutual fund market timing, merger approval, or proxy
fraud.4 9 Excluding such cases makes it possible to compare similar cases in
assessing the influence of bankruptcy. Apart from the excluded cases, the
data set contains virtually all of the securities class actions filed from 1996
to 2004. Unlike some prior studies, the data set includes not only settled
cases but also cases that ended in dismissal.
The data set contains 234 securities class actions involving companies
that were in bankruptcy during the pendency of the class action. Bankruptcy
cases thus make up 16 percent of the securities class actions in the data set.
On average, from 1996 to 2004, there were about twenty-five securities class
actions per year with a bankrupt issuer. Table 1 summarizes the number of
bankruptcy cases filed from 1996 to 2004:
48. Typically, multiple securities class actions are filed against a company. The court
will consolidate these class actions into one action and choose a lead plaintiff for the class
action.
49. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 13, at 722 (excluding cases involving allega-
tions relating to mergers and hostile takeovers); Choi, supra note 44, at 604-05 (excluding
IPO allocation cases from sample); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation
Refonn Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 932 ("The allegations in the [IPO] allocation




SUMMARY DATA ON NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCY CASES
IN DATA SET BY YEAR (1996-2004)
Percent of Securities
Class Actions that
Number of Securities Number of Were Bankruptcy
Year Class Actions Bankruptcy Cases Cases
1996 84 13 15.5
1997 139 17 12.2
1998 198 28 14.1
1999 173 26 15.0
2000 184 32 17.4
2001 155 38 24.5
2002 186 34 18.3
2003 163 33 20.2
2004 184 13 7.1
Total 1,466 234 16.0
The fact of a bankruptcy filing was evident in a number of ways. A case
was only classified as a bankruptcy case if there was clear evidence that the
court was informed of the bankruptcy because the bankrupt company was
not named as a defendant or the bankruptcy was referenced in a pleading
such as a complaint or notice of bankruptcy.5 0 In 198 of the 234 bankruptcy
cases (85 percent), as a result of the automatic stay, the securities class ac-
tion against the bankrupt company was formally dismissed or stayed, or the
bankrupt company was not named in the complaint.5 1 Of the 234 bankruptcy
cases, 54 (23 percent) of the bankruptcy filings occurred before the filing of
the complaint, and 180 (77 percent) of the bankruptcy filings occurred after
the filing of the complaint. 52
The bankrupt companies in the sample were modest in size, averaging
approximately $3 billion in total assets with a median of $400 million in
total assets.53 Nonbankrupt companies by comparison tended to be larger,
50. A notice of bankruptcy is a pleading filed by a party to apprise the court of a de-
fendant's bankruptcy. See, e.g., Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 99 n.l (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that
with the filing of a notice of bankruptcy, a securities class action was stayed against the issuer
but could proceed against individual defendants).
51. In some cases, the parties and court recognize that the bankrupt company will not
contribute anything to the settlement, but the company is not formally dismissed from the
case. In a small number of cases, the bankrupt company makes a contribution to the settlement
that is usually minimal.
52. This is consistent with an earlier study finding that auditor "litigation tends to pre-
cede bankruptcy." See Joseph V. Carcello & Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Auditor Litigation and
Modified Reporting on Bankrupt Clients, 32 J. ACCT. RES. (SUPPLEMENT) 1, 25 (1994)
("[L]itigation following bankruptcy has the lowest occurrence rate .... ).
53. It appears that a substantial percentage of large public companies filing for bank-
ruptcy face a securities class action. According to the LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database,
448 "large" public companies filed for bankruptcy from 1996 to 2004, the period of the data
set. Not all of the bankruptcy cases in the data set involved "large" companies. However, a
comparison of the data set with the cases listed in the LoPucki database found that at least 135
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averaging approximately $9 billion in total assets with a median of $3 bil-
lion in total assets.
The data set also collects information on various measures such as
whether a public pension fund was named as one of the lead plaintiffs,
whether the complaint included a section 11 claim, whether the complaint
alleges that the defendant restated its financial statements, whether the com-
plaint alleges insider sales as a motivation for the fraud, and whether there
was a parallel SEC proceeding. These variables are relevant in assessing the
merit and success of securities class actions. Table 2 presents summary sta-
tistics for some of these characteristics:
TABLE 2
VARIOUS SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DATA SET (1996-2004)
Percent of Data Set
Characteristic Number of Cases (1,466 observations)
Pension Fund Lead Plaintiff 227 15.5
Section 11 Claim 301 20,5
Restatement 466 31.8
Insider Sales 652 44.5
SEC Proceeding 176 12.1
Consistent with findings from other studies, a high percentage of the
cases in the data set settled or were dismissed. Almost a third of the cases in
the data set, 30.8%, ended in dismissal. 54 Almost half of the cases in the data
set, 47.7%, ended in a settlement of $3 million or more, a common thresh-
old used in determining whether a settlement is significant in size. A
relatively small percentage of the cases, 7.6%, resulted in settlement pay-
ments from parties other than the issuer such as auditors, underwriters, and
individual directors or officers.
of 448 (30 percent) of the large public companies that filed for bankruptcy from 1996 to 2004
were also the subject of a securities class action. Of course, these rates may not be transferable
to bankruptcies of smaller public companies as large companies may be more susceptible
generally to securities class actions. The 30 percent rate of suit for large bankrupt companies
is slightly higher than the 24 percent litigation rate for bankrupt companies found in a study
by Joseph V. Carcello and Zoe-Vonna Palmrose. See id. at 2 (studying a sample of 655 public
companies that declared bankruptcy between 1972 and 1992); see also Palmrose, supra note
16, at 96 (examining a sample of 458 companies declaring bankruptcy from 1970-1985 and
finding that 21 percent were involved in auditor litigation). It is also lower than the 38 percent
litigation rate for companies restating their earnings found in a study by Zoe-Vonna Palmrose
and Scholz. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, The Circumstances and Legal Conse-
quences of Non-GAAP Reporting: Evidence from Restatements, 21 CONTEMP. ACCT. REs. 139,
145 (2004).
54. I do not classify cases that are voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff as "dismissed"
and limit the term "dismissal" to cases in which the court decides a motion to dismiss against





SUMMARY OF CASE RESULTS FOR DATA SET (1996-2004)
Percent of Data Set
Result Number of Cases (1,466 Observations)
Dismissal 452 30.8
Significant Settlement 700 47.7
($3 million or more)
Third-Party Settlement 112 7.6
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Using the data set of securities class actions just described, this Part tests
two hypotheses regarding the relationship between securities fraud and
bankruptcy. To the extent that a securities class action reflects a valid allega-
tion of fraud, we can say that the action has merit. The study thus frames the
hypotheses in terms of the merit of securities class actions: (1) securities
class actions against bankrupt companies are more likely to have merit than
securities class actions against nonbankrupt companies, and (2) securities
class actions do not have more merit than securities class actions against
nonbankrupt companies but are perceived as having more merit. Stronger
support exists for the second hypothesis than for the first.
A. Hypotheses
The first hypothesis, that there is some actual correlation between bank-
ruptcy and securities fraud, predicts that bankruptcy cases have more merit
than nonbankruptcy cases and might be framed as follows:55
H(O): Bankruptcy cases are not more likely to have merit than nonbank-
ruptcy cases.
H(A): Bankruptcy cases are more likely to have merit than nonbankruptcy
cases.
The second hypothesis, that hindsight bias leads parties to perceive the
existence of a relationship between bankruptcy and securities fraud, predicts
that parties perceive bankruptcy cases as having more merit than nonbank-
ruptcy cases and might be framed as follows:
H(0): Bankruptcy cases are not more likely to be perceived as having merit
than nonbankruptcy cases.
H(A): Bankruptcy cases are more likely to be perceived as having merit
than nonbankruptcy cases.
Perhaps the most obvious way to test these hypotheses would be to
compare the outcomes of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases. If bankrupt-
cy cases succeed more often than nonbankruptcy cases, there is evidence
55. H(O) designates the null hypothesis and H(A) designates the altemate hypothesis.
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supporting both the actual-merit and perception-of-merit hypotheses. In-
deed, if litigation results do not differ, it would be difficult to conclude that
either hypothesis is supported.
However, looking solely at litigation results does not help decide be-
tween the actual-merit and perception-of-merit hypotheses. To do that, one
must also assess whether plaintiffs in bankruptcy cases are more likely to
allege credible evidence of fraud. Of course, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether a complaint describes actual fraud. However, as will
be discussed further below, certain allegations may be more likely to objec-
tively indicate a valid fraud claim. If bankruptcy cases are more likely to
contain such indicia of merit than nonbankruptcy cases, we might conclude
that they have more actual merit than nonbankruptcy cases.
B. Measures of Merit
This Section describes the various ways this study measures the merit of
securities class actions. Common measures of litigation results include
whether the case avoids dismissal, leads to a significant settlement, or re-
sults in a settlement from a third party. Common indicia of merit include
whether the complaint alleges an accounting restatement, alleges insider
sales, has a lead plaintiff that is a public pension fund, and whether there is a
parallel SEC proceeding. 6
1. Litigation Results
The end result of a securities class action is an obvious measure of mer-
it. If a group of cases has a higher rate of successful outcomes than another
group of cases, we might conclude that the first group has more merit than
the second.
Dismissal rates are an indicator of what courts think of a set of cases.5 7
If courts dismiss a set of cases at a high rate, it might be evidence that those
cases are less likely to have merit. If the dismissal rate of a set of cases is
low, it might be evidence that those cases are more likely to have merit. At
the same time, dismissal rates can reflect the difficulty of meeting height-
ened pleading requirements, prejudice by judges against certain types of
cases, bad luck, or poor lawyering. Dismissal rates also do not necessarily
measure what the parties themselves think of a case. A court often has im-
56. See, e.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 787 ("[O]ur participants frequently
mentioned earnings restatements, insider selling, and SEC investigations as highly significant
in determining settlement outcomes."); Choi et al., supra note 44, at 43 (noting that a restate-
ment, SEC investigation, or enforcement action is "hard evidence" of fraud); Perino, supra
note 49, at 948 ("[S]cholars and courts often consider allegations of accounting misrepresenta-
tions or unusual trading by insiders during the class period as generally stronger, all other
things being equal, than allegations that a company's forecasts or other predictive statements
were fraudulently made.").
57. For an example of a study that uses dismissal rates as a measure of merit, see C.S.




perfect information relative to the parties and can come to the wrong con-
clusion in deciding whether to dismiss a case. Because plaintiffs do not have
access to discovery until after the motion to dismiss is decided, the defend-
ant may have information relevant to the merits of the case that is unknown
to the court. Thus, dismissal rates are a useful but limited measure of merit.
Settlements are a rough indicator of what the parties think of a case. A
defendant generally will not settle a case unless it believes that the case has
some merit and that there is a risk that it will face higher costs absent a set-
tlement. Of course, not all settlements signal a suit with merit. Parties also
take into account litigation costs in negotiating a settlement. Small settle-
ments could only indicate that the defendant is willing to pay an amount less
than its litigation costs to make the suit go away.18 Thus, other studies often
consider only settlements over a certain threshold,5 9 often a threshold of $3
million,6" as significant enough to reflect merit. Of course, the $3 million
threshold is an imperfect measure since potential litigation costs vary among
cases. A settlement of less than $3 million can be high for some cases, while
a settlement of more than $3 million can be low for other cases. But as a
rough measure, the $3 million threshold can serve as a way of assessing the
success of a securities class action.6'
As discussed earlier, another way of measuring success is to compare
the size of settlements. Very large settlements can indicate greater merit than
small settlements. Absent bankruptcy, parties look at the potential damages
that could result from a judgment against the defendant in negotiating the
amount of the settlement.62 But as noted before, when a company is bank-
rupt, the size of any settlement is more likely to be below insurance policy
limits because the company is unlikely to contribute to the settlement. In-
stead of comparing the size of settlements, this study thus focuses on
whether a case ended in a significant settlement.
A settlement with a third party other than the company or the company's
insurance company is also a sign of merit. I define third-party settlements to
include settlements by parties unassociated with the company such as audi-
tors and underwriters, as well as individuals associated with the company,
such as directors and officers, when those individuals personally contribute
to the settlement. Such third-party settlements are relatively rare (represent-
ing only 7.6 percent of the sample), reflecting the high legal standard for
finding third-party gatekeepers such as auditors liable 63 and the reality that
58. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 727, 740-41 (1995)
("IA] key statistic in the merits debate is the difference between the observed settlement
amount and the amount a defendant would be willing to pay simply to avoid the costs of
mounting a defense.").
59. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 44 at 613-14 (using $2 million threshold).
60. See, e.g., Cox et al., supra note 46, at 381 (using $3 million threshold).
61. In addition to the $3 million threshold, I use higher thresholds in some calculations.
See infra Table 6.
62. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 791-96.
63. The Supreme Court has erected significant barriers to suits against gatekeepers. The
Central Bank case precluded aiding and abetting liability during the period of this data set. See
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directors and officers almost never personally contribute to securities class
action settlements. 64 Thus, payments by these parties could indicate that the
merits of a case are unusually strong.
It is important to acknowledge that these measures of success are relat-
ed. For example, significant settlements should result in part because parties
know that certain cases are likely to survive dismissal. Certainly, third-party
settlements are more likely in cases involving significant settlements than
cases without significant settlements. However, each measure of success
looks at the case from a different perspective. Judges decide whether to
dismiss a case, defendants and insurance companies decide whether there
will be a significant settlement, and third-party defendants decide whether a
third-party settlement occurs. Examining all three measures of success can
allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between
bankruptcy and litigation results than looking at just one measure can.
2. Indicia of Merit
If a group of cases has a higher rate of common indicia of merit than an-
other group of cases, we might conclude that the first group is more likely to
have merit than the second.
The fact that a defendant company has restated its financial statements is
widely considered to be an indicator of a securities class action's merit.65 A
restatement essentially concedes that there is a material misstatement in the
financial statements that the markets have relied upon in valuing a company.
Of course, a restatement by itself does not establish that the defendant acted
with fraudulent intent,66 but it does provide a starting point for a successful
securities class action. Consistent with these intuitions, prior studies have
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994). The impact of the Court's decision in Stoneridge, which was decided four years after
the last year of the data set, is likely limited with respect to this study, though some of the later
cases in the data set may have been affected. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67 (2008).
64. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deter-
rence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1551 (2006) ("The reality is that
corporate insiders are sued in order for the plaintiffs to gain access to their insurance, but their
personal liability appears not to be seriously pursued.").
65. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead
Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 892
(2005) ("[W]e consider one measure of the pre-filing strength of the cases ... the presence of
an accounting restatement .... ); Johnson et al., supra note 44, at 633-34 ("Some of the
strongest evidence to satisfy [the requirement of a material misstatement or omission] ... is a
violation of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that results in an earnings re-
statement, which is required only when earnings have been materially misstated.").
66. Indeed, a restatement might also indicate that management is conscientious about
acknowledging mistakes. Ideally, a distinction would be drawn between voluntary and invol-
untary restatements, but it can be difficult to find data that makes such a distinction.
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found that restatements are associated with successful securities class ac-
tions.6
7
Evidence of insider trading during the class period can also be an indica-
tor of merit. Many complaints allege that insiders were motivated to commit
fraud so they could sell their stock before the stock price collapsed. Allega-
tions of insider sales during the class period may be evidence that
defendants personally profited from misleading the market, making it easier
to satisfy the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") require-
ment that the complaint plead a strong inference of scienter with
particularity. 68 On the other hand, given the frequency of insider sales, it
could be that such sales were coincidental rather than part of a fraudulent
scheme. Courts could be wary of concluding that an allegation of normal
insider sales is in itself a good indicator of merit. At least one study has
found that an allegation of insider sales does not correlate with a com-
plaint's survival of a motion to dismiss. 69 Nevertheless, the inclusion of an
insider trading allegation in the complaint is a rough measure of whether a
case has meritorious evidence of fraudulent intent.
The involvement of a public pension fund as lead plaintiff can also be an
indicator of merit. 70 With the rising role of institutional plaintiffs in securi-
ties litigation, a number of commentators have posited that pension fund
lead plaintiffs are associated with successful securities class actions. 71 Pen-
sion funds are sophisticated institutions that can assess the merits of a suit
and make an informed choice about whether to become involved. A pension
fund's choice to serve as lead plaintiff may be an additional signal that the
case is persuasive. One study finds some evidence that pension funds are
likely to be involved in cases with stronger evidence of securities fraud
(reflecting the indicia-of-merit approach). 72 A number of studies also find
that pension fund lead plaintiffs are associated with higher settlements (re-
flecting the litigation-results approach). 73 However, it is unclear whether
67. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 44, at 646-47 ("[L]awsuits in the post-PSLRA
period are significantly more likely to result in a settlement if the firm restated class period
earnings."); Perino, supra note 45, at 382-83.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
69. See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 44, at 146.
70. This study focuses on public pension funds as lead plaintiffs because private pen-
sion funds may not be as publicly minded as public pension funds. When the study refers to a
pension fund, it is referring only to public pension funds. However, I also estimated regres-
sions using a broader definition of pension fund that included private pension funds, and the
results of the study did not differ.
71. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 65; James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the
Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106
COLuM. L. REV. 1587 (2006); Perino, supra note 45.
72. See Choi et al., supra note 65, at 892 ("These results ... suggest that public pen-
sions tended to target both larger stakes cases and those with stronger evidence of fraud.").
73. See id. at 896 ("[P]ension funds correlate with a significantly greater outcome for
the class in the post-PSLRA period .... ); Cox & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1636 ("Our data
shows that institutions increase settlements by 0.04% for every 1% increase in Provable Loss-
es.'); Perino, supra note 45, at 369.
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settlements in these cases are higher because pension funds push for better
results or because they tend to be involved in cases with merit. Either way,
the presence of a pension fund lead plaintiff is a signal that the case has
characteristics of merit.
Finally, the existence of a parallel SEC proceeding, regardless of wheth-
er it is an investigation or enforcement action, can indicate that a securities
class action has merit.7 4 The fact that a government enforcer without
economic incentive to over-enforce the securities laws has taken action is
evidence that the plaintiff's claim is not frivolous. In some cases, private
securities class actions are filed after an SEC enforcement action has been
filed. The SEC has subpoena powers allowing it to investigate allegations
prior to filing a case. A securities class action can include the evidence from
an SEC investigation in the complaint, making it more likely to survive a
motion to dismiss.
C. Tests for Association
This Section finds that bankruptcy cases are more likely to succeed than
nonbankruptcy cases in terms of litigation results. However, the evidence is
mixed with respect to whether bankruptcy cases are more likely to have in-
dicia of merit than nonbankruptcy cases. The study used a simple test for
association that compares bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases with respect
to litigation results and indicia of merit. Using a Pearson's chi-squared test,
it assessed whether any difference in the success rates of bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy cases is statistically significant. On the one hand, the higher
success rate of bankruptcy cases provides support for both the actual-merit
and perception-of-merit hypotheses. On the other hand, the fact that bank-
ruptcy cases succeed without clear evidence of greater indicia of merit
indicates that there is stronger support for the perception-of-merit hypothe-
sis than the actual-merit hypothesis.
1. Litigation Results
Table A2 of the Appendix compares the litigation results of bankruptcy
cases and nonbankruptcy cases. By all three measures, bankruptcy cases are
more likely to end successfully than nonbankruptcy cases. A lower percent-
age of bankruptcy cases (18%) were dismissed than nonbankruptcy cases
(33%). A higher percentage of bankruptcy cases (59%) resulted in signifi-
cant settlements than nonbankruptcy cases (46%). A higher percentage of
bankruptcy cases (24%) had third-party settlements than nonbankruptcy
cases (5%). All of these differences were statistically significant at the 1
percent confidence level. Figure 1 summarizes these results:
74. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 65, at 892 (using existence of an SEC investigation
as an indicator of merit).
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FIGURE 1
LITIGATION RESULTS
Judged by success, there is evidence supporting the two hypotheses that
bankruptcy cases are more likely to have merit or are perceived to have
more merit than nonbankruptcy cases. The difference appears to be most
pronounced with respect to third-party settlements.
2. Indicia of Merit
Table A3 of the Appendix compares rates of indicia of merit between
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases. There was a statistically significant
positive association between bankruptcy cases and restatements, though the
difference was not large (39 percent of bankruptcy cases have an accounting
restatement compared to 30 percent of nonbankruptcy cases). There was no
statistically significant difference in the percentage of pension fund lead
plaintiffs and parallel SEC actions for bankruptcy cases. There was a statis-
tically significant association between bankruptcy cases and insider sales,
but the association was negative, meaning that bankruptcy cases were less
likely to have allegations of insider sales that could support a scienter re-










0% I Restatement Insider Sales SEC Pension Fund
a Bankruptcy 39% 25% 15% 13%
oNonbankruptcy 30% 48% 11%16%
Thus, because bankruptcy cases are more likely to have restatements, there
is some support for the hypothesis that there is a difference in actual merit
between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases. However, the support is not
unambiguous, suggesting that the success of bankruptcy cases may reflect
perceived merit rather than actual merit.
D. Logistic Regression Analysis
Comparing rates of success and indicia of merit gives a rough sense of
whether bankruptcy cases have more merit, but fully understanding the rela-
tionship between bankruptcy and merit requires additional analysis. Though
we know that bankruptcy cases are more likely to succeed than nonbank-
ruptcy cases, simple comparisons do not explain why bankruptcy cases are
more successful. Is it because they have actual merit, or does the mere fact
that a company is bankrupt impact the result? Many factors can influence
whether a securities class action succeeds, and fully understanding the rela-
tionship between bankruptcy and the outcome of securities class actions
requires analysis of additional variables that can affect the outcome of a
case. Regression analysis can help us further understand why bankruptcy
cases are more likely to succeed than nonbankruptcy cases.
Though we have examined litigation results and indicia of merit sepa-
rately until this point, there is an obvious relationship between the success
of a lawsuit and the presence of indicia of merit. A suit is more likely to
succeed if it has indicia of merit such as allegations of a restatement or a
pension fund lead plaintiff. Judges are less likely to grant motions to dismiss
if indicia of merit are present. Moreover, parties are more likely to settle
cases for significant amounts and third parties are more likely to contribute
to a settlement if indicia of merit are present.
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In addition to indicia of merit, the fact that a company is bankrupt could
have an effect on the success of a lawsuit. As noted earlier, the fact of bank-
ruptcy might itself influence the decisions of judges and parties
independently from the existence of objective indicia of merit.
Simple models can be constructed that test the relationship between suc-
cess and indicia of merit. A bankruptcy variable can be included to test
whether the fact of bankruptcy influences the success of a securities class
action. If the bankruptcy variable is not statistically significant, we might
conclude that bankruptcy cases are generally decided the same way as non-
bankruptcy cases, If the bankruptcy variable is statistically significant, there
might be evidence that the fact of bankruptcy has an impact apart from the
merits.
I estimated logistic regressions75 with the various measures of litigation
results (dismissal, significant settlements, and third-party settlements) as the
dependent variable and independent variables reflecting indicia of merit
such as restatements, pension fund lead plaintiffs, insider sales, and parallel
SEC actions. I included an independent variable reflecting whether the case
is a bankruptcy case. The regressions also had case controls such as the size
of the company measured by total assets, whether the complaint alleged
section 11 claims, the length of the class period, and whether the case was
filed in the Second or Ninth Circuit.76 Variables such as the year the case
was filed, as well as industry of the issuer, were also included though they
are not reported in the tables that follow. Definitions of these variables are
set forth in the Appendix at Table Al. Equations for the estimated regres-
sions are set forth below:
(1) Dismissal = a + 01iBankruptcy + P32ilndicia of Merit + [33iCase Controls + Ei
(2) Significant Settlement = a + O3liBankruptcy + P32ilndicia of Merit + 033iCase Controls + Ei
(3) Third-Party Settlement = a + 3liBankruptcy + f2ilndicia of Merit + [33iCase Controls + ci
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions. For all three regressions,
the bankruptcy variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence
level. As the perception-of-merit hypothesis might predict, even when con-
trolling for indicia of merit and other factors, bankruptcy is negatively
associated with dismissal and positively associated with significant settle-
ments and third-party settlements. Thus, the study finds support for a
75. A logistic regression is a regression where the dependent variable is binary-that is,
can only take on the value of 0 or 1.
76. The total assets and class period variables are proxies for measuring potential dam-
ages awards. Larger damages are more likely in cases involving larger companies and longer
class periods. The section Il variable controls for the fact that it is easier for a plaintiff to
establish liability under section 11 because that provision does not require a showing of scien-
ter. The circuit variable assesses whether judges in different circuits are more or less willing to
allow securities class actions to proceed. See, e.g., James D. Cox et al., Do Differences in
Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Em-
pirical Analyses, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 421, 430-38 (2009) (describing differences in circuit
pleading standards for securities class actions).
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"bankruptcy effect" where bankruptcy cases are more likely to succeed than
nonbankruptcy cases."
TABLE 4
LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH DISMISSAL, SIGNIFICANT
SETTLEMENT, AND THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Significant Settlement
Variable Dismissal ($3 million or more) Third-Party Settlement
Log Total Assets .113* .198** .030
(3.64) (6.62) (0.54)
Pension Fund -.532** .635** 1.65**
(-2.68) (3.41) (5.17)
Second Circuit -.288 .172 .206
(-1.66) (1.07) (0.69)
Ninth Circuit -.133 .182 -.289
(-0.92) (1.32) (-0.93)
Section 11 -.366* .725** 1.13"*
(-2.32) (4.95) (4.48)
Bankruptcy -.740** .534** 1.92**
(-3.77) (3.24) (7.57)
Restatement -1.018** .818** 1.49"*
(-6.52) (6.12) (5.84)
Insider Sales -.046 .435** -.220
(-0.36) (3.53) (-0.83)
SEC -.198 .076 .210
(-0.86) (0.37) (0.63)
Class Period -.019** .024"* .045**
(-3.13) (4.35) (4,61)
Constant -2.21" -6.78"* -6.75
(-2.12) (-6.31) (-4.03)
Pseudo R2  0.09 0.12 0,32
Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Industry and year variables not reported.
*p<.0 5 .
**p<.0 1.
In addition, the restatement, pension fund lead plaintiff, and section 11 vari-
ables were all statistically significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent
confidence level for all three regressions. As might be expected, the sign of
77. It may be that different types of bankruptcies have different associations with the
measures of success. I estimated a number of logistic regressions in which the bankruptcy
variable was defined in different ways. For example, I estimated a regression in which the
bankruptcy variable was limited to bankruptcies where the company was liquidated. I also
estimated a regression where the bankruptcy variable was limited to bankruptcies where the
company was reorganized. I also distinguished between cases in which the bankruptcy filing
occurred prior to the filing of the complaint and cases in which the bankruptcy filing occurred
after the filing of the complaint. For the most part, these limited bankruptcy variables retained
their statistical significance. The exception was the limited bankruptcy variable in which the
bankruptcy filing occurred prior to the filing of the complaint.
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these variables was negative with respect to dismissal and positive with re-
spect to large settlements and third-party settlements. These results confirm
the intuition that these variables are valid indicia of merit.
The insider sales variable was not statistically significant with respect to
dismissal and third-party settlements, but was positive and statistically sig-
nificant with respect to large settlements. The lack of a statistically
significant relationship between insider sales and dismissal is consistent
with earlier studies.7" It may be that courts are not fooled by rote assertions
that a securities fraud was motivated by the desire of insiders to sell their
stock at a high price. With respect to third-party settlements, the fact that an
issuer's management sold its stock is unlikely to affect a case against gate-
keepers who did not benefit from such sales.7 9 On the other hand, the fact
that insider sales are positively associated with significant settlements might
indicate that the parties themselves assess such evidence in deciding wheth-
er a case has merit.
Surprisingly, the SEC variable is not statistically significant in any of the
logistic regressions. This likely reflects the broad definition of this variable,
which included not only cases that resulted in an SEC enforcement action
but also cases where there was an informal investigation that may not have
resulted in formal action.
Because these were logistic regressions, some translation is necessary to
interpret the regression results. In order to quantify the bankruptcy effect, 1
calculated the marginal effects of selected variables. The marginal effects
are a way of measuring the impact of an independent variable such as bank-
ruptcy on a dependent variable such as dismissal rates. For the dismissal
regression, the marginal effect for the bankruptcy variable was -0.14, mean-
ing that a bankruptcy case was 14 percent less likely to end in dismissal than
a nonbankruptcy case. As points for comparison, in the dismissal regression,
the marginal effect for a pension fund lead plaintiff was -0.10 and the mar-
ginal effect for a restatement was -0.19. For the significant settlement
regression, the marginal effect for the bankruptcy variable was 0.11, mean-
ing that a bankruptcy case was 11 percent more likely to end in a significant
settlement than a nonbankruptcy case.8 ° For the third-party settlement re-
gression, the marginal effect for the bankruptcy variable was 0.10, meaning
that a bankruptcy case was 10 percent more likely to end in a significant
third-party settlement than a nonbankruptcy case. s'
78. See, e.g., Pritchard & Sale, supra note 44, at 146 (finding that allegations of insider
trading are positively associated with dismissal and concluding that "courts are skeptical of
the rather noisy signal provided by such trades").
79. Of course, insider sales might make it more likely that directors and officers are
held personally liable, but directors and officers almost never personally contribute to settle-
ments. See Coffee, supra note 64, at 1550-5 1.
80. For the significant settlement regression, the marginal effect for a pension fund lead
plaintiff was 0.13 and the marginal effect for a restatement was 0.17.
81. For the third-party settlement regression, the marginal effect for a pension fund lead




MARGINAL EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES
Pension Fund
Litigation Result Bankruptcy Lead Plaintiff Restatement
Dismissal -0.14 -0.10 -0.19
Significant Settlement 0.11 0.13 0.17
Third-Party Settlement 0.10 0.09 0.08
In addition to estimating three separate logistic regressions, I also esti-
mated an ordered logistic regression in which the dependent variable was
equal to 2 if the case ended in a significant settlement ($3 million or more),
1 if the case ended in a settlement that was not significant (less than $3 mil-
lion), or 0 if the case ended in dismissal. This method takes into account the
possibility that the fact of settlement, regardless of size, can be a signal of
merit. The results are reproduced in the Appendix at Table A4. As with the
logistic regressions, the bankruptcy variable for the ordered logistic regres-
sion is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
By all three measures of success for securities class actions, controlling
for other variables that are predictors of a successful suit, bankruptcy is as-
sociated with successful securities class actions.
E. The Disappearing Bankruptcy Effect
An additional finding of this study is that the bankruptcy effect disap-
pears with respect to very large settlements, providing further insight into
the relationship between bankruptcy and securities class actions.
As noted earlier, a number of studies have found either no association or
a negative association between the size of a settlement and the fact that a
securities class action involves a bankrupt company. To verify these results,
I estimated a multiple linear regression in which the dependent variable was
the natural log of the size of the settlement, and the independent variables
were the same as those used for the earlier logistic regressions.82 The equa-
tion for this regression is below:
(4) In (Settlement Size) = a + [31iBankruptcy + [2ilndicia of Merit + 033iCase Controls + ci
Table A5 in the Appendix presents the results of the regression. As with
the prior studies cited, the bankruptcy variable was not statistically
significant, while other variables such as the restatement and pension fund
lead plaintiff variables retained their statistical significance.
82. The average size of settlement in all settled cases (excluding the Enron and World-
Corn settlements) was approximately $40 million while the median settlement was
approximately $6 million. The average size of settlement in settled cases involving a bankrupt
company (excluding the Enron and WorldCom settlements) was approximately $21 million
while the median settlement was approximately $7 million. The average size of settlement in
settled cases involving a nonbankrupt company was approximately $44 million while the
median settlement was approximately $6 million.
[Vol. 111:547
Securities Class Actions
Earlier, I noted that these results may be explained by the fact that com-
panies do not contribute to settlements when in bankruptcy. The size of
settlements in bankruptcy cases are often limited by D&O policy limits. The
study thus used in its main analysis a different measure of merit-the fact of
a significant settlement, defined as those settlements of $3 million or more,
rather than the size of the settlement-and found a statistically significant
relationship between bankruptcy and settlements of $3 million or more.
If D&O policies are affecting the size of settlements, one might expect
that the bankruptcy effect would fade as settlements grow larger. Though
significant in size, a $3 million settlement should fit well within the D&O
policy limits of almost all public companies.83 I grouped settlements into
different categories by size. As can be seen from Figure 3, bankruptcy set-
tlements represent a smaller proportion of the larger settlements than they
do of smaller settlements:
FIGURE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF SETTLEMENTS
o Bankruptey n Nonbankruptcy
137
> $3 million > $15 million >$20 million > 50 million > $100 million
Bankruptcy cases represented about 20 percent of the settlements over
$3 million, $15 million, and $20 million. Considering that the overall per-
centage of bankruptcy cases in the sample was approximately 16 percent,
bankruptcy cases were overrepresented relative to their overall proportion of
the overall data set. In contrast, bankruptcy cases represented 12-13 percent
of the settlements over $50 million and $100 million. For the largest
83. See, e.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 36, at 1806 (citing average D&O limits of
$28.25 million for small-cap companies, $64 million for midcap companies, and $157.69
million for large-cap companies).
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settlements, bankruptcy settlements were underrepresented relative to their
proportion of the overall data set.
In order to further determine the point at which D&O policies affect the
fact of a significant settlement, I estimated logistic regressions with higher
settlement thresholds of $10 million, $15 million, $20 million, and $50 mil-
lion as dependent variables. Table 6 reports the results of these regressions:
TABLE 6
LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS WITH SETTLEMENTS OF $10 MILLION OR MORE,
$15 MILLION OR MORE, $20 MILLION OR MORE, AND $50 MILLION
OR MORE AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable Settlement of $10 Settlement of $15 Settlement of $20 Settlement of $50
million or more million or more million or more million or more
Log Total Assets .354"* .440"* .501"* .674"*
(9.28) (9.66) (9.42) (7.96)
Pension Fund 1.41 ** 1.71 ** 1.74** 2.19**
(6.98) (7.69) (7.17) (6.78)
Second Circuit .316 .438* .367 .420
(1.66) (2.00) (1.50) (1.19)
Ninth Circuit .384* .631"* .308 .454
(2.26) (3.09) (1.28) (1.24)
Section 11 .593** .691 ** .705** .872**
(3.49) (3.51) (3.15) (2.69)
Bankruptcy .451 .480* .243 -.175
(2.41) (2.24) (.97) (-.43)
Restatement .855"* .677"* .941 ** 1.09**
(5.41) (3.61) (4.43) (3.51)
Insider Sales .308' .294 .259 .549
(2.03) (1.62) (1.25) (1.81)
SEC .434 .646* .810"* .957**
(1.88) (2.50) (2.86) (2.57)
Class Period .018"* .023** .028** .025*
(2.86) (3.36) (3.54) (2.44)
Constant -11.47 -13.56** -14.87** -22.24**
(-8.21) (-8.82) (-8.94) (-4.62)
Pseudo R2 0.21 .29 .33 .46
Note: z-stafistics in parentheses.
*p<.05 .
**p<.0 1.
Industry and year variables not reported.
The results show that while there is still a bankruptcy effect for settle-
ments of $10 million or more and $15 million or more, the bankruptcy
effect disappears for larger settlements of $20 million or more and $50 mil-
lion or more. This suggests that, on average, D&O policies begin affecting
the size of settlements in bankruptcy cases as they reach that $20/$50 mil-
lion threshold. Of course, there are still settlements in bankruptcy cases
above those thresholds, but there is not a statistically significant difference
compared to nonbankruptcy cases. It is likely that bankruptcy cases lose
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their advantage over nonbankruptcy cases with respect to settlements over
$20 million or so because of the lack of an issuer defendant.
It appears that there are two groups of securities class action settlements.
One set of settlements reflects payments within the limits of D&O policies.
Of the 700 or so settlements in the data set that are $3 million or greater,
about 200 are $20 million or greater, meaning that 500 of 700 (about 70
percent) of significant settlements were below $20 million and likely to fit
within D&O insurance policy limits. In addition, there are many settlements
below even the $3 million threshold. The second set of settlements reflects
payments that may exceed D&O policy limits. Only about 100 of the 700
settlements that were $3 million or more (14 percent) were above $50 mil-
lion, likely requiring a significant contribution by the issuer. Put another
way, over the nine-year span of the data set, about eleven cases per year set-
tled for $50 million or more, representing less than 10 percent of the 1,466
cases in the data set. Further study of settlements that do not settle within
D&O insurance policy limits may be fruitful.
IV. DISCUSSION
The evidence indicates that bankruptcy cases are more likely to succeed
than nonbankruptcy cases, though they are not likely to have greater rates of
most indicia of merit. The regressions confirm that bankruptcy has an inde-
pendent influence on the success of a bankruptcy case, apart from indicia of
merit. This Part assesses these results and concludes that there is stronger
support for the hypothesis that bankruptcy cases are perceived to have merit
than the hypothesis that bankruptcy cases are actually more meritorious.
Bankruptcy is a heuristic that judges use to avoid dismissing cases. Finally,
the study of bankruptcy cases has significance for a number of issues relat-
ing to securities class actions.
A. Bankruptcy Effect: Merits or Perception?
The bankruptcy effect likely reflects some difference relating to the mer-
its of bankruptcy cases. The question is whether the difference is real or
perceived. On balance, there is some support for both possibilities, though
the evidence more clearly supports the perception-of-merit hypothesis.
Perhaps the strongest evidence in support of the actual-merit hypothesis
is that bankruptcy cases are more likely to be associated with accounting
restatements than nonbankruptcy cases. Such a difference reflects an actual
difference in merits consistent with the Arlen and Carney last period agency
costs hypothesis. Bankruptcy cases are more likely to involve situations
where last period agency costs are in play, leading to a greater incidence of
actual fraud than nonbankruptcy cases where the incentive to commit fraud
may not be as strong. On the other hand, the difference is arguably not a
large one (39 percent of bankruptcy cases have restatements as compared to
30 percent of nonbankruptcy cases).
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The most powerful evidence against the actual-merit hypothesis is that
measurable indicia of merit such as allegations of insider trading, SEC
proceedings, and pension fund lead plaintiffs are not present at statistically
significant higher rates in bankruptcy cases.84 Some of these indicia, such as
the presence of a pension fund lead plaintiff, are arguably stronger indica-
tors of merit than the simple existence of a restatement. Restatements can
occur by mistake and a showing of fraudulent intent is usually necessary to
prevail in a securities class action. Pension funds presumably evaluate cases
holistically, weighing all possible indicia of merit, both obvious and non-
obvious. The presence of a credible party who can assess the merits of a
case is a stronger indicator of merit than the presence of a restatement.
The regression results, moreover, are evidence that perception of merit
rather than actual merit explains the tendency of bankruptcy cases to suc-
ceed at higher rates than nonbankruptcy cases. By controlling for various
indicia of merit that might explain lower dismissal rates and higher rates of
significant and third-party settlements, the logistic regressions isolate an
independent bankruptcy effect that is evidence that the greater success of
bankruptcy cases is not solely explained by the actual merits. A skeptic
might respond that the regressions only control for obvious indicia of merit.
There could be nonobvious measures of merit that cannot be easily scruti-
nized through empirical study. 5 Such nonobvious indicia of merit could be
correlated with bankruptcy and thus explain the bankruptcy effect. This ar-
gument, however, is ultimately unpersuasive without the identification of
particular nonobvious indicia of merit associated with bankruptcy. Moreo-
ver, some of the obvious indicia of merit, such as the pension fund lead
plaintiff variable, also reflect assessment of nonobvious indicia of merit.
This study's analysis of obvious indicia of merit indicates that perception
rather than actual merit is driving the success of bankruptcy cases.
B. The Bankruptcy Heuristic
The perception-of-merit hypothesis is consistent with the intuition that
judges tend to decide complex cases using mental shortcuts. The fact of
bankruptcy is likely a heuristic that influences how judges and parties per-
ceive the merits of bankruptcy cases, leading to higher success rates for
those cases relative to nonbankruptcy cases. In the bankruptcy cases in this
data set, judges and parties knew of the issuer's bankruptcy and could have
used the fact of bankruptcy as a way of sorting good cases from bad cases.
The "bankruptcy effect" found through regression analysis is evidence that
in some cases, a bankruptcy heuristic tilts the scales against dismissal or in
favor of a significant settlement.
The use of bankruptcy as a heuristic for merit is somewhat different
from the judging heuristics that scholars have focused on. For the most part,
84. Some of these variables were not statistically significant in all of the regressions.
However, the pension fund variable was consistently statistically significant for all regressions.
85. Choi, supra note 44, at 601 (discussing nonobvious indicia of merit).
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heuristics have been discussed as a way by which judges can dismiss cases
quickly to clear their dockets.86 In contrast, the use of a bankruptcy heuristic
is a way by which judges allow certain cases to proceed. The bankruptcy
effect counteracts the tendency of judges to dispose of securities class ac-
tions at an early stage.87 The existence of heuristics that make it less likely
that cases will be dismissed might make it more difficult to conclude that
judges always discriminate against securities class actions.
The use of a bankruptcy heuristic can be problematic insofar as it leads
to unjust results. As noted earlier, hindsight bias leads to a tendency to over-
estimate management's knowledge of factors resulting in a business failure.
It can be unfair to predicate liability on the happenstance that a defendant
was associated with a bankrupt company.88 If judges are less likely to dis-
miss bankruptcy cases, parties may take this into account in settling a case.
A bankruptcy provides a hint of scandal that influences parties to settle for
significant amounts. Defendants are especially risk averse in these situa-
tions, leading to preemptive settlements. Knowing this, plaintiffs could be
more aggressive in bringing securities class actions against bankrupt com-
panies so that they can extort settlement payments.
On the other hand, the bankruptcy effect may not be as problematic if
there are stronger policy reasons for securities class actions when the issuer
has filed for bankruptcy. The compensatory rationale for securities class
actions is more compelling when the issuer is a bankrupt company. The loss
by shareholders is likely significant and permanent rather than fleeting.
Without a securities class action, shareholders typically receive little or
nothing to cover their losses.89
Bankruptcy cases avoid the circularity problem that has commonly been
associated with securities class action settlements involving nonbankrupt
companies. 90 As a number of commentators have noted, settlements of secu-
rities class actions involving claims of secondary market fraud are circular
86. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opin-
ions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 87 (2002) ("[J]udges are using substantive heuristics to dispose of
securities cases at the motion to dismiss stage."); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C.
DAVis L. REv. 903, 946 (2002) ("[Clourts are, consciously or unconsciously, utilizing the
heuristics to clear complex cases that would otherwise remain on the dockets for lengthy peri-
ods of time.").
87. Stephen Choi finds that nonnuisance claims without "hard evidence" are more like-
ly to be dismissed post-PSLRA. Choi, supra note 44, at 598. Bankruptcy may be one setting
in which the PSLRA bias toward obvious indicators of fraud is not as influential.
88. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 602 ("[R]epeat players might notice the
tendency of biased judgments to raise standards after the fact, as might judges. This could
undermine the perceived fairness of the system of civil liability.").
89. Shareholders only receive recovery after creditors are paid. See 11 U.S.C.
§ l129(a)(8)(A), (b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
90. See, e.g., James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L.
REv. 323 (2009) (describing and critiquing circularity problem).
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because injured shareholders pay for part of their own remedy.9 In bank-
ruptcy, because shareholders are wiped out, payment does not come from
their own pockets in the form of a payment from the issuer they own. One
alternative source of payments is D&O insurance. Of course, shareholders
fund the costs of D&O insurance over time, but the payout to shareholders
can exceed the amount in premiums paid by the shareholders. Moreover,
when a company is bankrupt, there is greater incentive and ability to pursue
third-party wrongdoers. 92 Rather than solely targeting the company, a securi-
ties class action may be more likely to target auditors and underwriters who
stood by while the fraud proceeded.93 Payments by such third parties to
shareholders are not circular because they do not come from the company
(which is owned by the shareholders). And indeed, as this study shows,
bankruptcy cases obtain third-party settlements at a higher rate than non-
bankruptcy cases (24 percent of the time versus only 5 percent of the time).
Compensation from a successful securities class action provides sharehold-
ers with value that they would not have otherwise obtained and thus is more
difficult to characterize as a meaningless transfer from shareholders to
themselves.
94
Perhaps judges treat bankruptcy cases differently because they believe
the policy reasons are stronger for securities class actions when such actions
involve bankrupt rather than solvent companies. To come to this conclusion,
judges need not have a full appreciation of the nuances of shareholder com-
pensation for securities fraud but only an intuition that the context of
91. Coffee, supra note 64. Another version of the circularity problem states that be-
cause shareholders are diversified, they are as likely to be winners as they are to be losers from
securities fraud. In some cases, investors buy stock inflated by fraud but in others, they sell
stock inflated by fraud. However, if a company in an investor's portfolio goes bankrupt, it is
more difficult to offset such a loss with gains from securities fraud. Because the universe of
bankrupt companies is smaller than solvent companies, it is less likely that the loss from buy-
ing inflated stock in a company that later goes bankrupt would be offset by a corresponding
gain from selling inflated stock in a company that later goes bankrupt. Notwithstanding this
argument, it is important to acknowledge that a sufficiently diversified investor will be shield-
ed from significant losses from a bankrupt issuer, simply by virtue of the fact that no one stock
will be a large percentage of the portfolio.
92. As a general matter, gatekeepers are rarely named in securities class actions. See,
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Rele-
vant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 320 (2004).
93. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 64, at 1550 ("Although large settlements involving
accounting firms do occur, these often involve the insolvency of the corporate defendant (as in
Enron and WorldCom) so that the auditor becomes the defendant of last resort-namely, the
remaining defendant with a deep pocket.").
94. Bondholders may also be more likely to be plaintiffs in bankruptcy cases than
nonbankruptcy cases. In the data set, 32 of 234 (14 percent) bankruptcy cases involved bond-
holder plaintiffs. When a company is solvent, it is less likely that bondholders will suffer
losses than when a company is insolvent. The WorldCom case is an example where bondhold-
ers recovered billions of dollars after a bankruptcy through a securities class action. When
bondholders recover compensation, such payment is not a circular transfer. The transfer is
likely to come from a third party such as an underwriter or auditor, or from D&O insurance
that is funded by the shareholders.
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bankruptcy provides a better case for compensation. Judges could be dis-
missing these cases at lower rates because they believe that greater scrutiny
of the facts through discovery is necessary to unpack the relationship be-
tween the bankruptcy and the securities fraud allegations, and that such
inquiry is more likely to be worthwhile than when the case involves a
healthy company. Bankruptcy cases might thus succeed because judges take
a broad view of merit that includes policy considerations and not just indicia
of merit relating to the existence of fraud.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that judges are not easily duped by
hindsight bias, and that policy reasons are at least part of the reason why
judges are allowing such cases to proceed. Judges have long been aware of
the dangers of hindsight bias and have dismissed complaints that solely al-
lege "fraud by hindsight."95 Judges use the fraud-by-hindsight doctrine to
screen out cases that do no more than allege the occurrence of some bad
event.96 Though it is unlikely that the fraud-by-hindsight doctrine totally
solves the problem of hindsight bias,97 the existence of the doctrine raises
the possibility that judges are not declining to dismiss bankruptcy cases out
of ignorance, but because in their judgment, such cases deserve close scruti-
ny.98
The study finds some evidence supporting the idea that judges are wary
of concluding that bankruptcy is always associated with fraud. The bank-
ruptcy effect tends to be primarily associated with cases in which the
complaint was filed prior to the bankruptcy announcement. 99 In other words,
95. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d. Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.) ("[T]he complaint
is an example of alleging fraud by hindsight"); see also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d
624, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (applying the fraud-by-hindsight doctrine and
noting that "[b]ecause only a fraction of financial deteriorations reflects fraud, plaintiffs may
not proffer the different financial statements and rest").
96. See DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 627-28 (dismissing a complaint under the fraud-by-
hindsight doctrine because it alleged "nothing other than the change in the stated condition of
the firm"). One group of commentators describes the fraud-by-hindsight doctrine as "another
way of saying that plaintiffs must have more in their complaints than just backward induction
from the fact that a problem subsequently surfaced-there have to be facts showing awareness
at the time of the fraud:' Gulati et al., supra note 15, at 820.
97. E.g., Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 617 ("The 'fraud by hindsight' doctrine guards
only against a severe abuse of the hindsight bias; it does not entirely purge the system of the
bias's influence.").
98. It is interesting that hindsight bias does not appear to affect the SEC and pension
fund lead plaintiffs. The SEC does not investigate cases involving bankrupt companies at rates
greater than it investigates cases involving nonbankrupt companies. Pension funds do not
appear as lead plaintiffs at higher rates in bankruptcy cases. On the other hand, perhaps the
SEC and pension funds are more sophisticated in assessing securities fraud than generalist
judges.
99. As noted earlier, in 54 out of the 234 bankruptcy cases (23 percent), the bankruptcy
filing occurred before the filing of the complaint, and in 180 out of the 234 bankruptcy cases
(77 percent), the bankruptcy filing occurred after the filing of the complaint. I estimated re-
gressions where the bankruptcy variable was defined as including only the cases where the
bankruptcy occurred prior to the complaint. In those regressions, the bankruptcy variable was
not statistically significant. On the other hand, when I estimated regressions using only the
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the plaintiff when filing the complaint does not necessarily know that the
case will involve a bankrupt company. A judge in those circumstances may
be less likely to conclude that the case is targeting an issuer mainly because
it happened to file for bankruptcy. On the other hand, the bankruptcy effect
disappears with respect to bankruptcy cases in which the bankruptcy filing
occurs prior to the filing of the complaint. In other words, the plaintiff knew
at the time of the filing of the complaint that the case involved a bankrupt
company. It may be that judges are wary of cases in which plaintiffs appear
to be exploiting the fact of bankruptcy by filing a complaint. However, it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions from smaller subsamples of bankruptcy
cases that distinguish between case filings before and after bankruptcy.
The use of bankruptcy as a heuristic is a likely explanation for the bank-
ruptcy effect. Though hindsight bias is a factor, policy reasons might also be
why bankruptcy cases are decided differently. Whatever the reason, given
the ambiguity of the concept of securities fraud, we can expect judges and
parties to rely on context in assessing the merit of these cases.
C. Alternative Explanations for the Bankruptcy Effect
It is important to recognize that there are explanations other than merit
or perception of merit for the higher rate of success for bankruptcy cases.
There is less incentive to vigorously contest a case when the issuer is bank-
rupt. A company is unlikely to be required to cover the costs of a settlement
because any such obligation is typically discharged in bankruptcy. 100 Be-
cause management is often replaced after bankruptcy,'0 ' there is little
incentive for the company to aggressively defend the reputation of manage-
ment. Managers who are moving on from their jobs at the issuer do not have
a significant incentive to fight the suit as long as a settlement is covered by
D&O insurance.0 2 It can be more difficult for insurers to coordinate a de-
fense when managers are no longer with the company. Higher rates of
cases where the bankruptcy filing occurred after the filing of the complaint, the bankruptcy
variable retained its statistical significance.
100. See 1I U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2006) ("[Tihe confirmation of a plan... discharges
the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation .... ). Equity holders
often receive little to no distribution under a chapter 1I plan. See, e.g., Ayotte & Morrison,
supra note 31, at 522. Civil actions by equity holders against a chapter II debtor for securities
fraud will generally be treated as equity claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (subordinating claims
"arising from the purchase or sale of such a security" to the priority of distribution associated
with that security). Thus, the prospect of recovery for such claimants is low.
101. E.g., M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation
when Agency Costs Are Low, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543, 1596 (2007) (finding that 60 percent
of CEOs are replaced in the zone of insolvency); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 729 (1993) (finding that 95 percent of CEOs left office before or
during reorganization).
102. There is some evidence that managers do not suffer a reputational penalty for being
the subjects of a securities class action. Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of
Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J. L. & ECON. 365 (2006).
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significant settlements for bankruptcy cases could simply reflect that it is in
the best interest of the parties to settle the case rather than exhaust insurance
policy limits through litigation.
On the other hand, D&O insurers, auditors, underwriters, and directors
and officers who may have to personally contribute to a settlement, all have
an incentive to fight a securities class action. The cost of filing a motion to
dismiss is modest, and with the heightened pleading requirement for scien-
ter, there is an incentive to at least contest a securities class action with a
motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss focuses on procedural issues such as
pleading requirements and thus only needs minimal involvement from man-
agers who may have left the company. Indeed, a motion to dismiss is filed in
virtually every case in the data set. A motion to dismiss is filed in 90 percent
of the bankruptcy cases and 89 percent of the nonbankruptcy cases. Because
motions to dismiss are made at similar rates in bankruptcy and nonbank-
ruptcy cases,'013 lower dismissal rates are an indication that bankruptcy cases
are more likely to have merit from the perspective of the judges deciding
those motions to dismiss.
Moreover, a D&O insurer will not settle a case for significant sums un-
less there is some evidence of merit. A D&O insurer would likely fight for a
nominal settlement rather than one that approaches policy limits. The great-
er percentage of significant settlements in bankruptcy cases is thus evidence
that the parties involved believe these cases are more likely to have merit.
Finally, the higher rate of third-party settlements cannot be explained
solely by a lack of willingness to fight bankruptcy cases. Third parties have
incentives to resist securities class actions because they may be paying out
of their own pocket. 104 On the other hand, the higher rate of significant third-
party settlements might partly reflect that class action attorneys are more
aggressive in seeking third-party settlements in bankruptcy cases to supple-
ment settlements because the issuer cannot contribute.
D. Implications
What are the implications of these findings? This Section summarizes
the ways in which the results of this study have significance for our general
understanding of securities class actions.
First, a significant percentage of securities class actions involve failed
companies. Sixteen percent of securities class actions describe a situation in
103. Baker and Griffith find through interviews of participants in securities litigation
"that defendants filed a motion to dismiss in every case with which [the participants] were
familiar." Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 775.
104. Most of the third-party settlements involving bankrupt companies involve com-
plaints that only allege Rule l0b-5 claims. In thirty-two of the fifty-six (57 percent) third-party
settlements in bankruptcy cases, there were no section 11 claims. Thus, third parties in those
cases would have substantial defenses under Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1994), and Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158-61 (2008), both of which limit secondary liability
in Rule lOb-5 cases.
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which shareholders have lost virtually their entire investment. In addition,
there are many cases in which a company has not formally filed for bank-
ruptcy but is in financial distress. In these cases, criticisms such as the
circularity problem, which mainly apply to securities class actions against
solvent companies, are less of a concern.
Second, empirical support for the Arlen and Carney last-period hypothe-
sis is mixed. The finding that bankruptcy cases are more likely to have
restatements indicates that accounting fraud may be driven by a desire to
mask last-period developments. On the other hand, it is evident that securi-
ties class actions involving nonbankrupt companies are just as likely to have
other indicia of merit. If these securities class actions are an accurate reflec-
tion of the incidence of securities fraud, these results indicate that securities
fraud is not just a last-period problem, but is also a significant problem with
respect to solvent companies. Judges and parties should not readily assume
that securities class actions against nonbankrupt companies are necessarily
weaker than those against bankrupt companies.
Third, it is likely that in some cases, motions to dismiss and decisions to
settle are influenced by something other than the merits. Whether it is be-
cause of the pressure to settle in the context of a bankruptcy, hindsight bias,
or a sense that shareholders have a greater need for a remedy in bankruptcy,
bankruptcy cases are decided differently than nonbankruptcy cases. This
might be a troubling development, and perhaps judges should be educated
about these tendencies to reduce hindsight bias. On the other hand, to the
extent that bankruptcy cases serve a more compelling policy reason, the best
course may simply be to allow judges to use their discretion with respect to
bankruptcy cases.
Fourth, the Supreme Court should be wary of completely eliminating
secondary liability in Rule 10b-5 cases,10 5 though the findings of this study
indicate that it is prudent to make the standard for finding such liability
high. In bankruptcy cases, defendants such as auditors are important sources
of compensation because the issuer cannot contribute to the settlement. On
the other hand, there may be a tendency to conclude too quickly in bank-
ruptcy cases that third parties are liable even without strong evidence of
actual fraud. Judges who are deciding motions to dismiss with respect to
auditors in bankruptcy cases should be wary of the danger of hindsight bias.
E. Additional Observations Relating to Vicarious Liability
This study of bankruptcy cases also has implications for the desirability
of vicarious liability in securities class actions. These observations, howev-
er, are not the focus of this study and need more research to fully develop.
105. As noted earlier, the trend has been to make it more difficult to find secondary
liability in Rule lOb-5 cases. See supra note 104 (citing cases in which the Court rejected




In a typical securities class action, the issuer is responsible for mis-
statements made by individual agents. A number of commentators have
suggested eliminating such vicarious liability for securities fraud-on-the-
market cases. 106 Part of the rationale for this proposal is that entity liability
creates incentives not to target individual managers who might be responsi-
ble for the fraud. Focusing securities fraud liability on these individuals
could better deter securities fraud.
Bankruptcy cases shed some light on cases in which vicarious liability is
not a basis for liability. As noted earlier, because the issuer is typically not a
defendant, the securities class action can only proceed against managers and
third parties such as auditors. Bankruptcy cases are thus a setting where in-
dividuals rather than the company should be the focus of liability.
In the bankruptcy cases identified in this data set, there does not appear
to be additional inquiry into the responsibility of individuals for securities
fraud. Groups of directors and officers collectively settle and litigate suits
and it does not appear that courts look any deeper into establishing individ-
ual liability. Though there is a smattering of cases in which individuals
personally contribute to the settlement, the number is an insignificant per-
centage of the data set. These results may indicate that vicarious liability is
not the determinative factor in the lack of scrutiny of individuals in securi-
ties fraud cases. The nature of securities fraud could be such that systemic
rather than individual causes are responsible. Establishing individual liabil-
ity might simply be too difficult and costly in most cases, regardless of
whether there is vicarious liability.
CONCLUSION
This study began by advancing two hypotheses relating to the difference
between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases. The first was that there is a
difference in actual merits consistent with the view that fraud is more likely
in a last-period context. The second was that there is no actual difference in
merits but that bankruptcy cases are perceived to have more merit than non-
bankruptcy cases. Stronger support was found for the second hypothesis.
Even when controlling for various indicia of merit, there is a bankruptcy
effect that makes it more likely that bankruptcy cases will succeed. This
finding likely reflects a form of hindsight bias on the part of judges who
decide bankruptcy cases.
This study has implications for understanding the role of securities class
actions. Perhaps the most compelling cases brought by investors involve
companies that fall into bankruptcy in the wake of a fraud. The study of
bankruptcy cases shows that judges use heuristics not only to dismiss securi-
ties class actions but also to deny motions to dismiss. This tendency could
106. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 13, at 720 ("We conclude that enterprise liability
should not be applied to Fraud on the Market cases."); Coffee, supra note 64, at 1582 ("The
SEC can and should exempt the non-trading corporate issuer from private liability for
monetary damages under Rule I Ob-5.").
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reflect hindsight bias as well as the belief that there is a core set of cases
where there is greater consensus as to the utility of securities class actions.
Certainly, context matters in the way that judges and parties assess the merit






Log Total Assets Variable is equal to the natural log of the total assets of the issuer within one year
prior to the filing of a securities class action.
Pension Fund Variable = 1 if the lead plaintiff was a pension fund.
Variable = 0 if the lead plaintiff was not a pension fund.
Second Circuit Variable = 1 if the suit was filed in a district in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
Variable = 0 if the suit was not filed in a district in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
Ninth Circuit Variable = 1 if the suit was filed in a district in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
Variable = 0 if the suit was not filed in a district in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
Section 11 Variable = 1 if the complaint alleged a violation of section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933.
Variable = 0 if the complaint did not allege a violation of section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933.
Bankruptcy Variable = 1 it the issuer was in bankruptcy during the pendency of the securities
class action.
Variable = 0 if the issuer was not in bankruptcy during the pendency of the
securities class action.
Restatement Variable = 1 if the complaint alleged that the defendant issuer restated its financial
statements during the class period.
Variable = 0 it the complaint did not allege that the defendant issuer restated its
financial statements during the class period.
Insider Sales Variable = 1 if the complaint alleged that a defendant sold stock in the issuer
during the class period.
Variable = 0 if the complaint did not allege that a defendant sold stock in the
issuer during the class period.
SEC Variable = 1 if there was an SEC investigation or action relating to the subject
matter of the complaint.
Variable = 0 if there was not an SEC investigation or action relating to the subject
matter of the complaint.
Class Period Variable is equal to the length of the class period of the securities class action
measured in months.
Dismissed Variable = 1 if the final disposition of the case was dismissal.
Variable = 0 if the final disposition of the case was not dismissal.
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Significant Settlement Variable = 1 if the final disposition of the case involved a settlement greater than
or equal to $3 million.
Variable = 0 if the final disposition of the case did not involve a settlement greater
than or equal to $3 million.
Third-Party Settlement Variable = 1 if the final disposition of the case included a settlement by a
defendant other than the issuer.
Variable = 0 if the final disposition of the case did not include a settlement by a
defendant other than the issuer.
TABLE A2
BANKRUPTCY CASES AND LITIGATION RESULTS
Nonbankruptcy Bankruptcy
Dismissal




Pearson X2(1 )=21.67; p--0.000.
Significant Settlements ($3 million or more)
No Significant Settlement 669 97
(54%) (41%)
Significant Settlement 563 137
(46%) (59%)
Pearson X2(1 )=13.01; p=0.O00.
Third-Party Settlements
No Third-Party Settlement 1,176 178
(95%) (76%)
Third-Party Settlement 56 56
(5%) (24%)
Pearson X2(1)=104. 74; p=O.O00.
TABLE A3
BANKRUPTCY CASES AND INDICIA OF MERIT
Nonbankruptcy Bankruptcy
Restatements






No Insider Sales 638 176
(52%) (75%)












Pension Fund Lead Plaintiff
No Pension Fund Lead Plaintiff 1035 204
(84%) (87%)
Pension Fund Lead Plaintiff 197 30
(16%) (13%)
























Pseudo R2  .07
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TABLE A5
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION WITH LOG SETTLEMENT
SIZE AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Variable Significant Settlement





















Adjusted R2  .49
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Industry and year variables not reported.
*p<.0 5 .
**p<.01.
